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negligence, or (2) he was never in any "apparent peril" or (3) both.
One may or may not agree with the wisdom and ultimate justice of
refusing to apply the last clear chance doctrine in these situations, but
one cannot deny that these rules are clearer and more tangible than the
blank statement that plaintiff as been guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law. Why, then, does the court insist upon using this
phrase, which explains nothing and succeeds only in creating an aura
of mystery about the entire decision?
This note does not purport to analyze trends in the North Carolina
law of negligence, but more exhaustive and general research might well
reveal that the confusion in this area heralds a general reaction against
the doctrine of last clear chance and a tendency on the part of the North
Carolina court to apply it more sparingly.
DAVID M. CLINARD

Torts-Liability of Golf Courses to Invitees
In a recent North Carolina case, the court moved a step closer to
defining the liability of a golf course for accidents which occur on its
premises.' In affirming the non suit granted by the lower court, the
court held that the defendant golf course was under no duty to guard
against possible injury to patrons by reason of the maintenance of the
water hole which caused the plaintiff's injury and that the plaintiff's
evidence clearly indicated that he was contributorily negligent, which
2
barred his recovery as a matter of law.
In its discussion of the situation, the court placed the golf course in
the general category of places of amusement and the golfer in the general
category of invitee. As was correctly stated in the principal case, the
general rule is that the owner of a place of amusement "is not an insurer
of the safety of patrons, but owes them only what, under particular
circumstances, is 'ordinary' or 'reasonable' care." 3
'Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club et al., 240 N. C. 159, 81 S. E. 2d 375 (1954).
Plaintiff was playing golf on a course owned by defendants. After finishing the
ninth hole, he placed his caddie cart several feet away from a path leading to the
tenth tee. He drove his ball from the tee and returned to get his cart. After
getting the cart, he was injured when he stepped into an open terra cotta hole
which was used by the defendants in connection with watering the greens. The
hole was normally covered, and there was evidence to show that it had been uncovered for 30 to 50 days prior to the accident. The court granted the defendant's
motion for non-suit.
2 Other jurisdictions have reached a similar result in similar situations by application of the doctrine of assumption of risk. See: Young v. Roass, 127 N. J. L.
211, 21 A. 2d 762 (1941) ; Schlenger v. Weinberg, 107 N. J. L. 130, 150 Atl. 434
(1930) ; Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club, 105 Wash. 215, 181 Pac. 679 (1919);
Note, 32 N. C. L. REv. 366 (1954).
' Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club et al., 240 N. C. 159, 163, 81 S.E. 2d 375, 378
(1954). See also: Boucher v. Paramount-Richards Theaters, 30 So. 2d 211 (La.
Ct. App. 1947) ; Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N. W. 2d 453 (1947) ;
Revis v. Orr, 234 N. C. 158, 66 S.E. 2d 652 (1952) ; Patterson v. City of Lexing-
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In quoting from an earlier case,4 the court gave this rule of liability:
"The owner of a place of entertainment is charged with an affirmative,
positive obligation to know that the premises are safe for the public use,
and to furnish adequate appliances for the prevention of injuries to be
anticipated from the nature of the performance, and he impliedly warrants the premises to be reasonably safe for the purpose for which they
are designed." 5 This seems to be the accepted rule in North Carolina 6
as well as in other states.7
Although there have been several decided cases in North Carolina
dealing with injuries to golfers, there has been no definite statement by
the court as to what the legal rights of a golfer are in relation to the golf
8
course owner. According to this case and the Restatement of Torts,
it would seem that a fee-paying golfer playing on a golf course would
be a "business invitee" of the golf course. In relation to the distinction
between an "invitee" and a mere "licensee," it has been held that in
North Carolina, in order "to constitute one an invitee of the other, there
must be some mutuality of interest. Usually an invitation will be inferred where the visit is -of interest or mutual advantage to the parties,
while a license will be9 inferred where the object is the mere pleasure or
benefit of the visitor."
In view of the fact that the business of a golf course is the playing
of golf and its chief source of revenue is derived from fees paid by playing golfers, it is natural to conclude that the fee-paying golfer on the
premises is a "business invitee" of the golf course. His rights then would
be those normally due an invitee on the premises.' 0
ton, 229 N. C.637, 50 S. E. 2d 900 (1949) ; Schentzel v. Philadelphia Nat. League

Club, 173 Pa. Super. 179, 96 A. 2d 181 (1953) ; Peck v. Stanley Co., 335 Pa. 608,
50 A. 2d 306 (1947) ; Whitfield v. Cox, 189 Va. 219, 52 S. E. 2d 72 (1949).
'Smith v. Cumberland Agricultural Society, 163 N. C. 346, 79 S. E. 632 (1913).
' Farfour v. Golf Club, 240 N. C. 159, 163, 81 S. E. 2d 375, 378 (1954).
' Drumwright v. North Carolina Theaters, 228 N. C. 325, 45 S. E. 2d 379
(1947) ; Ross v. Sterling Drug Store et al., 225 N. C. 226, 34 S. E. 2d 64 (1945) ;
Hiatt v. Ritter, 223 N. C. 262, 25 S. E. 2d 756 (1943) ; Bowden v. Kress, 198 N. C.
559, 152 S. E. 625 (1930) ; Smith v. Cumberland Agricultural Society, 163 N. C.
346, 79 S.E. 632 (1913).
' Boucher v. Paramount-Richards Theaters, 30 So. 2d 211 (La. Ct. App. 1947) ;
Rouillard v. Canadian Klondike Club, 316 Mass. 11, 54 N. E. 2d 680 (1944);
Shanney v. Boston Madison Square Garden Corp., 296 Mass. 168, 5 N. E. 2d 1
(1936); Modec v. City of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 29 N. W. 2d 453 (1947);
McCullough v. Omaha Coliseum Corp., 144 Neb. 92, 12 N. W. 2d 639 (1944);
Henry v. Segal, 174 Pa. Super. 313, 101 A. 2d 149 (1953) ; Denton v. Third Avenue
Theater Co., 126 W. Va. 607, 29 S. E. 2d 353 (1944).
' RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 32 (1934): "A business visitor is a person who is

invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them."
' Pafford v. Jones Construction Co., 217 N. C. 730, 735, 9 S. E. 2d 408, 411
(1940); accord, Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Newton, 131 F. 2d 845 (4th Cir.
1942).
10 Anderson v. Reidsville Amusement Co., 213 N. C. 130, 195 S. E. 386 (1938).
Cf., Brooks v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 679 (E. D. N. C. 1951), affirined, 194
F. 2d 185 (4th Cir. 1952) ; McDonald v. Woolworth Co., 177 F. 2d 401 (4th Cir.
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However, the recorded cases where a golf course has been held responsible for accidents occurring on or about its land are few. In one
of these cases, the course was held liable for not enforcing safety regulations on its premises, which negligence resulted in a player's being hit
by a ball driven by another player.1 In another situation, a motorist
on an adjoining road was injured as a result of a ball's being hit from
the golf course.1 2 This case was decided against the course because
the layout of the premises was such that it was a natural hazard of the
game that balls would be hit into the road. In two other cases which
involved defects in the premises, the courses were held liable because
of these defects. They involved a caddie suffering injuries when a small
bridge on which he was standing collapsed,13 and a boy receiving injuries when he accidentally touched a guy wire leading to an electric
power line. 14
The principal case seems to be the first case on record, certainly,the
first one in North Carolina, "where a patron of a golf course has sued
to recover damages as a result of stepping into any kind of hole on or
about a golf course."' 5
However, in one Missouri case, the court held that a spectator at a
golf tournament could not recover for injuries sustained when she tripped
over a rock concealed by tall grass, in the absence of any showing that
the golf course had any previous knowledge of the protruding rock.' 0
1949) ; Hall v. Holland, 47 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1950) ; Price v. Taylor, 302 Ky. 736,
196 S.W. 2d 312 (1946) ; Revis v. Orr, 234 N. C. 158, 66 S. E. 2d 652 (1952);
Barron v. Fuel Co., 159 Pa. Super. 35, 46 A. 2d 506 (1946).
" Everett v. Goodwin and Starmount Golf Club Inc., 201 N. C. 734, 161 S.E.
316 (1931). Plaintiff was playing golf on the course owned by the defendant golf
course when he was struck by a ball driven by the defendant golfer who had failed
to give the customary warning of "fore." The Court held that the defendants
were jointly liable. Contra: Schlenger v. Weinberg, 107 N. 3. L. 130, 150 Atd. 434
(1930).
"' Gleason v. Hillcrest Golf Course, Inc., 148 N. Y. Misc. 246, 265 N. Y. Supp.
886 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1933). Plaintiff was riding in an automobile on a highway
adjoining the course operated by the defendant when a ball driven from the course
struck and shattered the windshield of the car, injuring the plaintiff. The golf
course was held liable. See also: Castle v. St. Augustine's Links, 38 T. L. R.
(K. B. 1922) 615.
3 Claremont County Club v. Industrial Accident Commission, 174 Cal. 395, 163
Pac. 209 (1917). A caddie leaned against the handrail of a bridge spanning a small
creek on the golf course owned by the country club. The rail gave away, and the
boy fell, sustaining a permanent injury to one of his elbows. The court held the
country club liable; accord, Low v. City of Gastonia, 211 N. C. 564, 191 S.E. 7
(1937).
1
Texaco Country Club v. Wade, 163 S. W. 2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
The court held that a caddie who went to the defendant country club to seek employment in response to an invitation from the club manager and who placed his
hand on a guy wire extending from a light pole and received an electric shock
was an "invitee" and that the club was liable for his injuries.
1" Farfour v. Mimosa Golf Club et al., 240 N. C. 159, 162, 81 S. E. 2d 375, 378
(1954).
"°Thompson v. Sunset Country Club, 227 S.W. 2d 523 (St. Louis Ct. App.,
Mo. 1950).
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The court seemed to feel that the spectator here was not injured as a
result of any unusual danger on the golf course which she could not have
anticipated and for which she did not assume the risk. Also, there has
been one case in which a patron of an "obstade" golf course sued for
injuries resulting from a fall on a sloping fairway. 17 The owner in this
case was not held liable, because this was the type of risk assumed by the
patron when he played the game. The Massachusetts court seemed to
rule that a patron assumed the risk in a case where the patron, who had
used a golf driving range five times previously, was struck by a ball
driven by a third person.18 All three of these situations are easily distinguishable from the principal case in that they do not involve accidents
to golfers playing on a regular golf course.
According to the general rules of law in regard to the liability of
occupiers of land to invitees on the premises, it would seem that the
occupier (in this situation the golf course) could be held liable for injuries sustained by the invitee (golfer) so long as the invitee is reasonably engaged in the furtherance of the business at hand-in this case,
playing golf.
The court found in the principal case that the place where the water
hole was located was "no part of the terrain designed for playing the
game of golf" ;19 therefore the defendants were under "no duty to anticipate that patrons would travel in the area of the water hole and to guard
against possible injury to them by reason of the hole." 20 By so finding,
the court, in effect, ruled that the invitee had gone beyond the range of
invitation and had become a mere licensee who had to take the premises
as he found them. Had not the court held that the plaintiff had gone
beyond the area of the invitation, it appears that the court would have
held that the golf course was under a duty to guard against possible
injury and, except for the element of contributory negligence, would
have been liable for the injuries sustained. This is certainly in accord
with the majority of the cases which deal with this problem.
However, this writer feels that the court's limitations of the playing
area were too restrictive in view of the nature of the game. Whether a
slight deviation for the purpose of placing a caddie cart out of the
golfer's way could be considered an act in the furtherance of the game
"'Young v. Roass, 127 N. J. L. 211, 21 A. 2d 762 (1941).
Plaintiff went to an
"obstacle" golf course, paid admission fee and began playing. He was subse-

quently injured when he fell on the seventh fairway on which there was a slope
of six inches descending at a 45-degree angle. The court held that there was an
"assumption of risk" by the plaintiff and refused recovery for the injuries sustained.
"8Katz v. Gow, 321 Mass. 666, 75 N. E. 2d 438 (1947).
"oFarfour v. Mimosa Golf Club et al., 240 N. C. 159, 165, 81 S. E. 2d 375, 380

(1954).
20

Id. at 165, 81 S. E. 2d at 380.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

seems to be a question over which reasonable men might differ and
21
rightly a question for the jury.
DONALD LEON MOORE

Torts-Libel in Will-Publication-Liability of Estate
Where a testator left ten dollars to his grandson and in the will
accused him of squandering one thousand dollars, of deserting his
mother and the testator by taking sides against him in a lawsuit, and of
shirking his duty in World War II, the Oregon Supreme Court held
that "an action will lie against the testator's estate for libelous matter
contained in a will published after the death of the testator."' This
decision, because of its rather clear logic, should help to swing the balance toward some degree of certainty in a field which, at the present
time, shows little uniformity of result. There are three other decisions
in this country in which the same result was reached as in the instant
case 2 and three in which liability was denied.3
Two of the cases denying recovery do so on the theory that the common law maxim actio personalis moritur cur persona applies in these
21 In affirming the granting of the motion for non suit, the court felt that the
evidence was so clear that no other reasonable inference was deducible. Donlop v.
Snyder, 234 N. C. 627, 630, 68 S. E. 2d 316, 319 (1951). Cf., Cox v. Railroad, 123
N. C. 604, 607, 31 S. E. 848, 850 (1898): "The plaintiff's evidence must . . .be
accepted as true, and construed in the light most favorable for him. . . . It is
well settled that if there is more than a scintilla of evidence tending to prove the
plaintiff's contention, it must be submitted to the jury, who alone can pass upon
the weight of the evidence." See also: Texaco Country Club v. Wade, 163 S. W.
2d 219, 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942): "The test of whether one on premises used
for public purposes is an invitee at the exact place of injury seems to be whether
the owner of the premises ought to have anticipated the member of the public at
this point on the premises devoted to public use. It is not essential that the owner
should have foreseen the precise injury to any particular individual, but merely
that some like injury might, and probably would, result to someone lawfully on
the premises.... The duty to keep premises safe for invitees does not necessarily
apply to the entire premises. It extends to all portions of the premises which are
included within the invitation, and which are necessary or convenient for the invitee
to use in the course of the business for which the invitation was extended, and at
which his presence should therefore reasonably be anticipated, or which he is
allowed to go." See, e.g., Heller v. Select Lake City Operating Co., 187 F. 2d
649 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Mulford v. Hotel Co., 213 N. C. 603, 197 S. E. 169 (1938) ;
Texas Public Service Co. v. Armstrong, 37 S. W. 2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).

v. Matthieu, 266 P. 2d 686, 690 (Ore. 1954).
Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; In Matter
of Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (Orphan's Ct. 1901) ; Harris v. Nashville
Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584 (1913).
'Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313
(1933), reversing Hendricks v. Citizens' and Southern Nat. Bank, 43 Ga. App.
408, 158 S. E. 915 (1931); Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 Atl. 487 (1934);
Carver v. Morrow, 213 S. C. 199, 48 S. E. 2d 814 (1948). The Nagle case would
seem to overrule the decision allowing recovery in Gallagher's Estate, supra note
2, not by repudiating the basic theory of the lower court but by carrying the case
into the field of privilege.
1Kleinschmidt
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